RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS

permanent, but were not actually so, had abandoned the right which
was incompatible with them during their existence. It is difficult
in such a case to discern any sufficient reason for supposing that
the disuse of the right was to continue longer than the works which
prevented its exercise.
There could have been no question of the subsistence of the
right, if the owner had declared his intention to resume possession,
on the contingency which happened. The intention to relinquish
the right absolutely was a fact not to be presumed.
It seems to have been assumed that the abandonment to be presumed from the construction of works incompatible with the exercise of the right, depends upon the intention of the party to whom
the servitude is due, so that if the intention to preserve the right,
notwithstanding the disuser, is declared, no abandonment will result
from any disposition of the property which prevents the possession
or use of the right. It is thus apparent that the intention to
abandon a right is a fact to be proved, either by the circumstances
of the case or the declarations of the party entitled to the servitude.
S.F.D.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS UPON LEADING
QUESTIONS.
ANCIENT LIGHTS.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS

OF FUTURE ACQUISI-

TIONS.

I. There is no subject more important to the practical lawyer
than to be able to keep pace with the decisions of courts of last
resort upon leading questions.

By the imperfect and tardy mode

of reporting in this country, it is almost impossible to do this, beyond the limits of the state where one resides. And even in
regard to that limit, we often have to depend upon tradition and
common report, for the decisions of the courts, for years. While
we obtain the authentic decisions of the English courts in the
London Jurist and Law Journal, and other English periodicals, by
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every new arrival by steamers, brought down within a few weeks,
at most, we often have to wait as many years for the only reliable
reports of the American states. This defect is in part suppliedby
the early publication of select opinions of the judges in the Law
Journals, and to some extent, and in an imperfect manner, by brief
notes of cases, which in general afford but a poor guide to the real
matter of the decisions themselves.
And in regard to the English cases, it is impracticable to afford
them, in the American Law Journals, or in any other way, in such
a form as to render them accessible to the great mass of the profession, until the appearance of the republication of tthe regular
volumes of reports. To supply this defect in part we shall give,
occasionally, the brief abstract of the English decisions upon
Leading Questions, which is, after all, the most reliable guide we
can have towards maintaining the just equilibrium of the advancing
and varying progression of the principles of the common law, and
of equity jurisprudence.
IL Within the last few months the English courts have been
very much occupied by questions of ancient lights.
1. It seems to have been the early practice in the English courts
to treat ancient lights as dating from the earliest limit of prescription, - during time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary ;" or from the time of Richard I. There are many evidences of this rule in the early cases, and the forms of declarations contained an allegation to that effect: Aldred's Case, 9 Co.
Rep. fo. 57. And in Buryt vs. Pope, Cro. Eliz. 118, it seems, from
the opinions of the judges, that at that period, thirty or forty
years was not a sufficient term to give windows the character of
ancient lights. See also 1osewell vs. Pryor, 2 Salk. R. 459, s. c.
12 Mod. R. 215, where it seems to be required that some equivalent
averment to the existence of the plaintiff's lights, -time out of
mind," must be found in the declaration.
2. There seems no doubt that as early as the English Revolution, window lights which had become established by the legal
time of prescription were entitled to be protected against obstruction: 3 Kent Com. 448; JT illers vs. Ball, 1 Show. 7; Palmer vs.
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Fletcher, 1 Lev. 122. And in modern times the period of prescription has been limited to twenty years, in regard to light and
other incorporeal hereditaments: 3 Kent Com. 448 ; WILMOT, J.,
1761, in Lewis vs. Price, 2 Saund. R. (Williams' ed.) 175, n. a, b,
c. In .Daieet vs. North, 11 East 371, it was held that twenty
years' uninterrupted possession of window lights was sufficient
ground from which a jury might presume a grant or covenant,
provided the landlord had knowledge of the facts as well as his
tenant.
3. But of late the most serious questions have arisen in regard
to the rights of the respective parties, where the owner of these
ancient lights, for his own accommodation, assumes to alter or enlarge the same. What course shall the adjoining owner pursue to
prevent such altered lights acquiring the character of ancient
lights ? This question arose in 1enshaw vs. Bean, 16 Jur. 814;
s. c. 10 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 417. And after very elaborate argument, and an advisarevult, on the part of the court, it was decided,
in an elaborate judgment by Lord CAMPBELL, Ch. J., with whom
JJ.

PATTESON, WIGIITMAN

and COLERIDGE concurred, that where

a party who had the right to access of the light and air through
certain ancient windows, makes an alteration in the size of ihe
windows, so as to exceed the limits of his ancient right, he thereby
acquires nothing in addition to his former right; and if the excess
cannot be obstructed by his neighbor in the exercise of his lawful
rights on his own land, without at the same time obstructing the
ancient right, such party must be considered as having by his own
act suspended and lost for the time his former right.

It was here

doubted whether the ancient right was entirely destroyed by the
alteration. And similar doubts are suggested in other and more
recent English cases: Wilson vs. Townend, 6 Jur. N. S. 1109;
s. c. 1 Drew. & S. 324, 380; Hutelinson vs. Copestake, 8 C. B.
N. S. 102; 9 Id. 863; Binsk vs. Pash, 11 Id. 824.
But in the case of Jones vs. Taplivg, 8 Jur. N. S. 333, which
was heard in the Common Pleas in January 1862, before four
Judges, this question was distinctly raised, and the Chief Justice
and WILLIAMS, J., were of opinion that the putting out new and
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enlarging old windows, is not an abandonment of the right, but
that on the dominant owner replacing his windows in their original
state, the servient owner is bound to take down his wall, or whatever other obstruction he may have erected ; and that its having
been erected in a perinanent manner did not afford a reason for
keeping it up. While BYLES, J., held that the wall having been
rightfully erected, the servient owner could not be called upon to
remove it, because the dominant owner had seen fit to abandon his
illegal claim. And KEATING, J., held that the dominant owner,
by omitting an illegal claim, must be regarded as having abandoned his legal claim, in such a manner that he could not reassert
it. The court being equally divided in opinion, the junior judge,
KX ATING, withdrew his opinion, and judgment passed for the
plaintiff, that a writ of error might be brought- in the Exchequer
Chamber, where the case was heard, in July last, and reported in
the May 9th number of the London Jurist. It was decided in the
Exchequer Chamber, by four judges against two, POLLOCK, C. B.,
and MARTIN, B., dissenting, that where the owner of the dominant
tenement has opened 'new lights in his house, in such mode that
the owner of the servient tenement cannot prevent the right to the
new lights attaching, and being gained as against himself, without
obstructing the old lights, he is allowed to obstruct and excused
from obstructing the old lights, so long as, and to subh an extent
as is necessary for him to do in order to prevent the attempted
usurpation of the right to the new lights. But if the servient
owner keeps up the obstruction, after the windows of the dominant
owner are restored to their original state, he is liable as occupier
of the land for maintaining an obstruction to the lights of his
neighbor. These views, and the opposite, by the dissenting
members of the court, are maintained in most elaborate opinions,
reviewing the course of decision from the earliest period. All the
judges concurred in the soundness of the decision of Benslaw vs.
Bean, except BLACKBURN, J., and BRAMWELL B., who held the
opposite view, in opinions which the London Jurist characterizes
as "being rather long than luminous."
This must be regarded as settling the law in England, for the
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present at least, unless the case should be carried into the House
of Lords, of which we hear no intimation, and which we infer is
not to be done. " We must say, that to us, the opinion of the dissenting judges, both upon the ground that the assertion of an illegal claim must be regarded as an effectual estoppel upon the
dominant owner afterwards reasserting his former legal claim ; and
also, that however this may be, it is certain that the servient
owner having lawfully erected a permanent obstruction to the illegal assertion of claim, is not compellable to remove it, upon the
dominant owner withdrawing his claim within legal limits, is more
in consonance with equal moral justice, and also with legal principles as applicable to the acts of the several parties, than the
opinions of the majority of the court of error. We trust the question may speedily be brought to the determination of the court of
last resort, and that the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber will
be reversed.
We are not aware that this precise question has arisen in this
country, and we do not apprehend, if it should arise, that it would
receive the same favorable consideration in behalf of the dominant
owner, attempting to enlarge his rights by usurpation, as already
stated. It is apparent, from a careftil examination of the American cases, that there exists throughout the American States a very
decided disposition to reject the doctrine of the English courts in
favor of ancient lights. These will be found carefully analyzed in
Professor Washburn's late work upon Easements and Servitudes,
pp. 498-505.
In Massachusetts the last vestige of the English rule was abandoned in Carriggvs. Dee, 14 Gray 583 ; see also Rogers vs. Swain,
10 Id. ; Collier vs. Price, 7 Id. 18 ; Fifty] Associates vs. Tudor,
6 Id. 255 ; Johnson vs. Jordan, 2 Met. 284; Atkins vs. Chilson,
7 Id. 898, 403.
In New York the same course of decision has been followed
through a long succession of. years: .Mahan vs. Brown, 13 Wend.
261, 263; Banks vs. American Tract Society, 4 Sandf. Ch. 488;
Parkervs. PLote, 19 Wend. 309 ; Nyers vs. Gemel, 10 Barb. 537.
See also Radcliff vs. Mayor, &c., 4 Comst. 195, 200. And this
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course of decision has been adopted in Maine : Pierrevs. Fernald,
26 Me. R. 436; and in Maryland, in Cherry vs. Stein, 11 Md. R. 1,
overruling a former case in that state ; and in Raverstick vs.
Sipe, 33 Penna. St. R. 868, 371, following in the wake of former
cases in that state ; and in South Carolina, in ]Iapier vs. BuiwinIde, 5 Rich. 311, overruling Mcready vs. Thomson, Dudley 131.
Many of the other American States adhere to the rule of the
English law upon this subject, which consideration, and the further
one that the same rule in regard to claiming beyond the rights of
the dominant owner, will apply to water rights, and other easements, as well as to that of ancient lights, will be a sufficient
apology for this extended notice of the cases, upon the points
which we have discussed.
III. The subject of the assignment of non-existing property, in
equity, is one of great interest in these active commercial times.
The assignment of future acquisitions will not become operative at
law: Robinson vs. JTacdonnel, 5 Maul. & Sel. 228. But in equity
it is settled, by a long course of decisions, that such an assignment
is perfectly valid and 'effectual, if made upon a valuable consideration : Curtis vs. Auber, 1 Jac. & W. 526 ; Douglas vs. Russell, 4
Sim. 524; s. c. 1 My. & K. 488; Langton vs. H~orton, 3 Beavan
464; 1 Hare 549; Lindsay vs. Gibbs, 22 Beavan 522.
This subject came under consideration, in the recent case of
Hoiroyd vs. JIarshall, 9 Jur. N. S. 213, which was decided in
August last. The question arose between a mortgagee of machinery in a mill or manufactory and a levying creditor. The
mortgage was by the terms of the deed to be operative upon "all
machinery, implements, and things which during the continuance
of the security, should be fixed or placed in or about the mill and
buildings, in addition to or substitution for the premises, or any
part thereof." The assignment was made for the security of
£5000, with the right of possession in the assignor or mortgagor
until demand of payment and his default in meeting the same, and
then for the mortgagee to sell and raise the sum for which the security was given. The schedule contained specified articles, and
all other machinery, &c., then and thereafter in the mill. The
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deed was duly registered, as a chattel mortgage, or bill of sale,
and the mortgagor remained in possession of the mill, and placed
other machinery there in addition to that which was there at the
date of the deed.
It was held by Vice-Chancellor STUART, and this decree was
affirmed by the House of Lords (notwithstanding the reversal of
the same by the Chancellor, Lord CAMPBELL), that as between the
,mortgagee and an attaching creditor, the former was entitled to
all the machinery in the mill, at the date of the levy of the execution, including the added and substituted machinery. That immediately upon the new machinery and effects being fixed or placed
in the mill, they became subject to the operation of the contract,
and passed, in equity, to the mortgagees, to whom the assignor or
mortgagor was bound to make a legal conveyance, and for whom
he was in the mean time a trustee.
The opinion of Lord Chancellor WESTDURY, the present Lord
Chancellor, is regarded as a masterly exposition of the application
of equitable principles to the subject. Lord CAMPBELL, in reversing the decree of the Vice-Chancellor, seems to have gone
upon the ground that there was no sufficient possession taken by
the mortgagee, and that his title was at most an equitable one,
and must yield to a more valid legal title, backed by equal equity,
which he regarded as being the case with all bondfide creditors.
The present Lord Chancellor, who gave the only opinion in the
House of Lords, and upon which the decree of Lord CAMPBELL
was reversed, goes into a most exhausting review of the subject,
both upon principle and the decided cases, and shows very conclusively, that the equity of an equitable mortgagee, whether his
right rest merely in contract, or be accompanied by constructive
or actual possession, possesses so far a priority and advantage over
the rights of a mere attaching or levying creditor, that it was
competent for a, court of equity to interfere to protect the former
against the latter.
This decision, resting as it does upon most unquestionable
grounds of principle and authority, cannot fail to have an important bearing upon similar contracts in this country, which have

